Non-verifiability of compliance with nuclear arms treaties

On-site inspections of military installations by international agencies to control nuclear weapons inventory limits are unachievable. Inspection of nuclear weapons materials production facilities are also beyond the scope of international treaties. National sovereignty and security issues stand in the way of both. Compliance with international agreements concerning limiting nuclear arms depends on good faith as well as the known vulnerability of nations to documented or photographic espionage and consequent exposure of violation evidence to world opinion.

1. Non-verification of compliance

1. Unfulfilled treaty obligations
2. Internationally non-cooperative governments

1. Covert violation of international treaties

1. Limited acceptance of international treaties

1. Verifying compliance with nuclear arms treaties
2. Preventing nuclear proliferation
3. Preventing movement of weapons-usable nuclear materials to non-nuclear states
4. Negotiating convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons
5. Monitoring international conventions

1. Nonverifiability
2. Noncompliance