The term 'common property' has been largely misunderstood and falsely interpreted for the past two-three decades. Common property regimes are not the free-for-all they have been described to be, but are structured ownership arrangements within which management rules are developed, group size is known and enforced, incentives exist for co-owners to follow the accepted institutional arrangements, and sanctions work to insure compliance.
There are four principal types of possible management regimes for common property: state property, private property, common property, and open access.
The topic of common property natural resources – and the tenurial regimes that come to be regarded as suitable alternatives for the purposes of accelerated growth – is critical to the practical work on development projects, primarily in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries. The job of designing or appraising such projects is a matter of complex craftsmanship. Central to this process are not only the technical and financial skills, but also a conceptual understanding of the socio-economic and cultural fabric within which individuals use and/or abuse their ecosystem.
Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' model predicts the eventual overexploitation or degradation of all resources used in common. Given this unambiguous prediction, a surprising number of cases exist in which users have been able to restrict access to the resource and establish rules among themselves for its sustainable use. Evidence accumulated over the last twenty-two years indicates that private, state, and communal property are all potentially viable resource management options. A more complete theory than Hardin's should incorporate institutional arrangements and cultural factors to provide for better analysis and prediction.