Non-verificability of compliance with nuclear power safeguards

The non-military uses of nuclear power involve the hazards of accidents at sites near international borders, the possibility of nuclear power plants being targets of sabotage or of acts of war, and the diversion of nuclear materials from commercial or civil applications to surreptitious weapons manufacture. There are no adequate means of inspecting for violations or hazards by international agreement.

In May 1984, nuclear experts from 19 countries agreed on guidelines under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency to deal with the accidental release of radioactive materials across national boundaries. The IAEA is a purely advisory body with no enforcement powers. The guidelines can be and are ignored at the convenience of national governments, as the USSR did at the time of the Chernobyl accident.

1. Non-verification of compliance
2. Military secrecy
3. Lack of international cooperation

1. Reduction in building of nuclear power stations
2. Radiation accidents
3. Plutonium pollution
4. Nuclear reactor accidents
5. Nuclear power station irradiation
6. Internationally non-cooperative governments
7. Ineffective official inspection of regulated activities
8. Inadequate building inspection

1. Inadequate nuclear reactor safeguards
2. Deterioration of nuclear power plants

1. Environmental secrecy

1. Refusing international inspection of nuclear sites
2. Maintaining secrecy in the nuclear power industry
3. Exposing secrecy in the nuclear power industry
4. Complying with nuclear power safeguards
5. Accepting inspection of nuclear sites

1. Noncompliance
2. Refusal
3. Secrecy